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ISRAEL’S ENDLESS WAR : IS IT ALL IN THE NUMBERS?
The Huffington Post, July 18, 2006 by Gabriel
Rotello
The attacks on Israel by Hamas and Hezbollah are a
bad omen for anyone hoping that the Zionist dream of a "normal state"
was anywhere near realization, 58 years after Israel's founding.
Hamas and Hezbollah are outright rejectionists.
They don't want Israelis to simply vacate the occupied territories; they
want Israelis to vacate Israel.
And they're backed by Iran, Syria and - if reports
are true - a large, enthusiastic percentage of the Arab population.
Which raises the interesting historical question:
Why would this be? Why would Israel face such ferocious resistance to
its very existence after so many decades as a fact-on-the-ground?
Especially when so many other nations that are the products of a similar
kind of settlement migration - including the US, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, much of South America - quickly emerged as geographically
unassailable.
One possible answer is that there are different
categories of settlement migration. Most turn out peacefully in the end,
but one almost never does.
Historically the most common type of settlement
migration was settlement migration followed by assimilation. France is a
typical example. Its people are descended from Gauls, later waves of
Roman settlers, and even later waves of Frankish invaders and other
tribes who settled, intermarried, assimilated and ultimately morphed
into the French. These settlers and conquerors often fought at first,
but assimilation and intermarriage eventually put an end to their
differences.
This was by far the most common type of settlement
migration in history, and it led to most of the stable modern national
identities in the world today.
The last few hundred years have seen a different
category come to the fore: settlement migration without assimilation,
but with overwhelming demographic superiority. This model prevailed in
much of the New World, Australia and New Zealand.
In most of these cases, native populations in these
regions were perfectly prepared to keep resisting the settlers
endlessly. The factor that finally convinced them to give up was not the
settlers' superior technology, military might or organization. It was
numbers.
In cases after case, the beleaguered but resisting
tribes fought bravely until the day they looked out across the horizon,
saw endless wagon trains, charging locomotives, massive cities rising on
the plains, and realized they had been completely outnumbered. Then, and
only then, did they reluctantly but decisively give up.
But if overwhelming demographic superiority is the
key factor in that model, what happens when history produces settlement
migration without overwhelming numbers?
There, the historic record has not been kind to the
settlers.
They may start off victorious due to superior arms,
technology, organization, leadership, alliances, social cohesion, etc.
But the defeated locals have no real motivation to admit defeat. They
can see that they themselves have the overwhelming numbers, and assume
that sooner or later they will prevail.
So they fight on endlessly, leading to two general
outcomes.
One is endless conflict, often punctuated by
periods of truce, but always followed by more conflict. The other is
that the newcomers themselves are eventually driven out, or at least
driven out of power.
Consider a few examples:
In the 1500s and 1600s the Protestant English and
Scotch settlers in Ireland never came close to swamping the Irish
numerically, and neither side ever dreamed of assimilating. So the
struggle between the Catholic natives and the Protestant settlers has
raged off and on in Ireland for four centuries. Even periods of peace
lasting many decades eventually give way to more conflict.
Or consider the French settlement of Algeria.
Hundreds of thousands of French colons may have thought they had created
a stable new world in Algeria, but they were surrounded by several
million Algerians well aware of their own numerical superiority. Today
that French world has completely vanished.
Another example is the white presence in southern
Africa, which turned out quite differently from the white presence in
the Americas and Australia not because it was morally less defensible,
but because it was numerically less defensible.
Even in the Americas, in regions where native
populations remain in the majority without substantial assimilation,
like Guatemala, Ecuador and Peru, wars and uprisings have flared for
five hundred years.
The same thing even happened to Moslem settlers in
places like India and Spain where they never swamped the natives
numerically. In Spain they were eventually driven out. In India, there
was a chaotic division and brutal population transfer at Independence,
followed by tension, terrorism and wars ever since.
Tellingly, one of the most notable examples
happened on the very ground where Israel sits today. The European
Crusaders carved out a dynamic and powerful settlement in much of what
is now Israel and Lebanon that thrived for about a century. But the
Arabs knew they had the numbers and never gave up. In the end, the
Crusader state disappeared.
Looking out over the historic record, it is
difficult to find any example of settlement migration that lacks either
assimilation or overwhelming demographic superiority (or both) that ever
turned out well for the newcomers.
Israel today is a nation of 5.3 million Jews and
1.3 million Arabs. There is no serious intention on either side to
assimilate in terms of widespread intermarriage or conversion to the
others' religion, language or culture.
Israel is surrounded by an ocean of 300 million
Arabs, expected to rise to over 400 million by 2020. Even discounting
the total Arab population of the region, just the Palestinian population
west of the Jordan River alone is approaching parity with the Jewish
population.
In a situation like that, it would be very hard to
convince committed opponents of Israel to give up, admit defeat and
accept the relative crumbs of a truncated mini state in Gaza and the
West Bank. Why accept crumbs, when history indicates you can ultimately
get the whole cake?
This realization - as much as wounded Arab pride,
legitimate grievances about the Israeli occupation, or Islamic
radicalism - may provide a clue to the seemingly endless allure of the
rejectionist ideology of groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.
To Westerners, it looks like the Arabs keep losing
and just can't admit it. To many Arabs, mindful of the history of the
Crusader states, it seems equally obvious that they are guaranteed to
win in the long run, as long as they are not betrayed by feckless
leaders.
This is not to say that history produces iron laws,
for Israel or anyone else. Recorded history has been far too brief to
produce anything like historic laws, and human conflicts can be tempered
by free will and creative thought.
The relatively benign fate of the white settlers in
South Africa is an example of how vision and reconciliation can trump a
historic record that would not necessarily have predicted such a
peaceful outcome. Though even there, the outnumbered settlers had to
relinquish political power.
But the tragic history of non-assimilating settlers
who lacked overwhelming numerical superiority does indicate one thing:
If Israel ever convinces its neighbors to genuinely welcome it to the
neighborhood as a fully integrated and normal state, it will be a feat
unprecedented in history.
Conversely, if Israel faces endless conflict, if
groups like Hamas and Hezbollah continuously arise and find legions of
eager followers, that's pretty much what the historic record would lead
us to expect. And so far, it seems to be what we've got. |